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 Should We Hold the Obese Responsible? 
 Some Key Issues 
 MORTEN EBBE JUUL  NIELSEN and  MARTIN MARCHMAN  ANDERSEN 
 Abstract:  It is a common belief that obesity is wholly or partially a question of personal 
choice and personal responsibility. It is also widely assumed that when individuals are 
responsible for some unfortunate state of affairs, society bears no burden to compensate 
them. This article focuses on two conceptualizations of responsibility: backward-looking 
and forward-looking conceptualizations. When ascertaining responsibility in a backward-
looking sense, one has to determine how that state of affairs came into being or where the 
agent stood in relation to it. In contrast, a forward-looking conceptualization of responsibility 
puts aside questions of the past and holds a person responsible by reference to some desirable 
future state of affairs and will typically mean that that he or she is subjected to criticism, 
censure, or other negative appraisals or that he or she is held  cost- responsible in some 
form, for example, in terms of demanded compensation, loss of privileges, or similar. One 
example of this view is the debate as to whether the obese should be denied, wholly or 
partially, free and equal access to healthcare,  not because they are somehow personally 
responsible in the backward-looking sense but simply because holding the obese responsible 
will have positive consequences. Taking these two conceptions of responsibility into account, 
the authors turn their analysis toward examining the relevant moral considerations to 
be taken into account when public policies regarding obesity rely on such a conception 
of responsibility. 
 Keywords:  obesity ;  personal responsibility ;  health care allocation ;  social inequality in health ; 
 distributive justice ;  luck egalitarianism 
 Many believe that most individuals are wholly or partially  personally responsible 
for being overweight or obese:  1  obesity is wholly or partially a question of  choice . 
Many also believe that when an individual is responsible for some unfortunate 
state of affairs, then society does not owe that individual compensation. This view 
is central to the theory of luck egalitarianism,  2  and many laypersons seem to 
agree.  3  
 Responsibility can be understood in many quite different senses. We shall focus 
on two central types of conception. A  backward-looking conception of responsibility 
concerns, ultimately, control over (or some other form of relation to) choices and 
causes of some state of affairs, for which one can then be said to be responsible, or 
some other connection between prior and later states of affairs. When ascertaining 
whether or not an individual is responsible for some state of affairs, one has 
to look backward to how that state of affairs came to be or which relation the 
agent stood in vis-à-vis that state of affairs. The other rendering of responsibility 
is  forward looking . This is the form of responsibility involved in, for example, 
deterrence. One might ignore questions of the past completely when arguing that 
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a person should be incarcerated—what justifi es holding someone responsible is 
the expected outcome that it will deter other potential criminals, and so on. 
 Imagine that personal responsibility in the backward-looking sense is impossible, 
or at least so extremely unlikely to hold true that it is not intellectually honest 
to defend. Where would that leave “responsibility” in the moral landscape for 
decisionmakers, politicians, practitioners, and so on? Would the obese have no 
responsibility for the (eventual) ensuing consequences of their obesity? Dismissing 
the backward-looking notion of responsibility clearly implies that we should 
not—indeed, cannot—justify differential treatment (in a broad sense) of different 
citizens in virtue of their different levels of responsibility for prior choices or 
previous states of affairs. However, forward-looking responsibility— holding 
persons responsible, as it were—might still be justifi ed, for example, on the grounds 
of effi ciency or, ultimately, promotion of welfare. What are the relevant moral consid-
erations to be taken into account when public policies regarding obesity rely on such 
a conception of responsibility? This is the question we want to pursue in this article. 
 In order to justify posing the question in this way, however, we need fi rst to 
make a case for denying the cogency of backward-looking responsibility. This 
necessarily takes us into thorny patches of metaphysical discussion, such as the 
debate over free will, compatibilism, and agent causality. While running the risk 
of oversimplifi cation, we attempt to make that journey as comfortable as possible. 
 We then turn to the practical implications of setting backward-looking respon-
sibility aside for the question of obesity. We here focus on the following questions: 
Is it really effi cient, in terms of welfare, to hold the obese responsible? If there are 
ways in which it is effi cient, so understood, which other moral concerns are 
relevant? How would such a policy fi t with due considerations about equal respect 
for differing conceptions of the good in liberal societies? 
 The Impossibility of Backward-Looking Responsibility 
 In this section we discuss the backward-looking idea of responsibility. First, we 
focus on a naturalistic approach to responsibility. By this we mean, roughly, an 
account that fi ts with the theories commonly held in the natural sciences. The 
argument here is that such a naturalistic view renders (backward-looking) respon-
sibility impossible. We then briefl y turn to two so-called compatibilistic accounts 
of responsibility. We argue that they are not ultimately convincing. 
 The Naturalistic Approach to Responsibility 
 In our daily practices it seems natural that we hold one another responsible for our 
actions, including at least some of our lifestyle characteristics. Suppose Sam com-
plains about being obese at some get-together over coffee and then reaches out for 
a third piece of cake. Ignoring reasons of politeness, nothing seems more obvious 
than to ask, “Why don’t you just leave it?” However, if we allow ourselves to ask 
 why Sam eats this third piece of cake, it is not very obvious that Sam in fact  can act 
differently. Consider Galen Strawson’s “basic argument”:
 (1) It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity 
and early experience, and it is undeniable that these are things for which 
one cannot be held to be in any way responsible (morally or otherwise). 
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 (2) One cannot in any later stage of life hope to accede to true moral 
responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way one already 
is as a result of heredity and previous experience. 
 (3) For both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change 
oneself, and the degree of one’s success in one’s attempt at change, will 
be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and previous 
experience. 
 (4) And any further changes that one can bring about only after one has 
brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the 
initial changes, by heredity and previous experience.  4  
 Now, if we ask  why Sam eats the third piece of cake, it seems that whatever cause 
we will fi nd to explain it will itself be an effect of another cause, which also will be 
an effect of a cause, and so forth. We will soon realize that when Sam is eating the 
third piece of cake, it is the result of a chain of causes and effects involving not just 
Sam’s earlier experiences but also in fact events and states before Sam was born, 
such as genes and epigenetic infl uences. Sam eats the third piece of cake simply 
due to reasons that are ultimately beyond Sam’s control, and, similarly, if Sam 
 changes eating behavior and somehow manage to eat less cake, it would also be 
due to reasons that are ultimately beyond Sam’s control. How could Sam ever be 
responsible for that? 
 The naturalistic approach to responsibility can be expressed in two formal 
requirements: A person P is responsible for an act (or omission) X only if
  
  1)  P had the ability to do otherwise, that is, not to perform X (the ability-to-do-
otherwise requirement).  5  
  
 If every event in the world is determined by prior causes, then Sam can never do 
otherwise. However, we do not know if every event in the world is determined by 
prior causes. There may simply be random factors. If this is so, then Sam may have 
had the ability to do otherwise. But we are not looking for the ability to do otherwise 
due to random factors—we want  Sam , not some random factors, to be the very 
cause of the action. We are looking for Sam’s  self-determination , and we therefore 
need a second requirement:
  
  2)  P is responsible for the causes of X (regression requirement).  6  
  
 Combining the ability-to-do-otherwise requirement with the regression require-
ment, we cannot ascribe responsibility to Sam in cases in which Sam  could have 
done otherwise, but only due to random factors. If Sam’s choices and actions are 
determined  or random, then Sam cannot be responsible. This seems indeed intui-
tively plausible, and if this is so, then responsibility begins to look impossible. 
However, there is one alternative remaining that may make responsibility possible 
given our two requirements. This is the possibility of  agent causality . 
 Agent causality is the view that agents are able to start new causal chains that are 
neither predetermined nor completely random. However, agent causality is highly 
contestable, and no one seems to have given any fully satisfactory explanation of 
how it is supposed to work.  7  It is of course diffi cult, if not impossible, to demon-
strate the falsity of agent causality, but following a method of inference to the best 
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explanation, agent causality is probably ruled out. If Sam eats fi ve cakes as an 
agent-causal performance, it follows that there is no further causal explanation as 
to  why Sam did so other than Sam doing so: Sam did it, and that is the  cause . But 
this seems to be a complete denial of the very strong and widespread intuition that 
events, including human acts, happen for causal reasons. If Sam eats fi ve cakes, 
it seems to be a rather unsatisfying explanation just to say that Sam ate the cakes 
because Sam did so. Few would probably agree that Sam’s decision to eat fi ve 
cakes has no further causal explanations, such as psychological conditions and 
social circumstances. Thus, agent causality is probably false, and if so, then, on a 
naturalistic account, responsibility is impossible. 
 Compatibilist Accounts of Responsibility 
 The fact that Sam is eating the cakes is probably determined by heredity and earlier 
experiences. Unless agent causality is possible, Sam is therefore never able to do 
otherwise in such a way that satisfi es the regression requirement. But one may 
challenge the very claim that the  ability to do otherwise is what responsibility requires. 
One infl uential compatibilistic account focuses on our “true identity”: if there is a 
correspondence between our fi rst-order preferences and who we really want to be 
(our second-order volitions), then we are responsible. So, if Sam in fact wants to over-
eat, then Sam is responsible.  8  Another compatibilistic approach to responsibility 
focuses on whether an agent is appropriately  responsive to reasons . In Fischer and 
Ravizzas’s infl uential account, it takes two things for an agent to be responsible. An 
agent must know the particular facts surrounding his action and must act with the 
right forms of beliefs and intentions in order to be responsible.  9  Moreover, an agent 
must act from a mechanism that is the agent’s  own reasons-responsive mechanism.  10  
An agent is reason responsive if the mechanism on which he or she acts would, in 
some possible world in which there is reason to do otherwise, lead him or her to act 
on that reason and hence do otherwise.  11  So, if Sam, in another possible world, would 
be responsive to relevant reasons not to overeat, then Sam is responsible. 
 These compatibilist accounts can be said to be  ahistoric views of personal respon-
sibility. Roughly, for the former account, what matters is the match or mismatch 
between an agent’s deeply held preferences (identity) and fi rst-order desires, and 
not the way in which this identity and these desires arose in the fi rst place. For the 
latter, what matters is whether or not an agent would have responded differently 
to a counterfactual set of relevant reasons, and the  history of the reasons-responsive 
mechanism is only captured by the requirement of the reasons-responsive mecha-
nism to be the agents’ own. This ahistoric tactic is probably necessary to avoid 
being entangled in a regress that will inevitably point back to some set of causal 
factors for which no individual can be responsible. 
 However, this tactic is also a weak spot in both theories, for it seems weird to 
ignore the past in an assessment of whether or not a given individual is responsible 
for his or her preferences, identity, or reason responsiveness. When we deliberate 
about whether or not Sam is responsible for his or her obesity or for its eventual 
medical consequences, we will, on these accounts, be lead to assess whether Sam 
identifi ed (repeatedly) with eating the cakes (Was it a part of Sam’s true identity?) 
or whether Sam was appropriately sensitive to reasons, and so on. But if it is a 
legitimate part of our assessment of Sam’s (eventual) responsibility to look at such 
prior states of affairs, it seems legitimate as well to look at the conditions under 
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which Sam’s identity was formed, or the circumstances relevant for Sam’s being 
appropriately sensitive to reasons. Because one could hardly, if ever, be said to be 
responsible for  those conditions and circumstances, it seems wrong to claim that 
Sam is responsible, all things considered.  12  
 Moreover, most people are inclined to accept at least some set of excusing or 
mitigating circumstances when it comes to responsibility. For instance, many 
would probably accept that if a person is genetically predisposed to become obese 
(e.g., the thrifty-gene hypothesis), then that would lessen responsibility. The same 
goes,  mutatis mutandis , for social conditioning, epigenetic infl uences, and so on.  13  
However, the compatibilist theories just mentioned cannot cater to such intuitions: 
what matters for them is only identity or reason responsiveness. If one does want 
to stick to the intuition that genes (and so on) can affect and lessen responsibility, 
then it seems that one has to go to the naturalistic account—which, inevitably, 
leads to the conclusion that responsibility is impossible. 
 The Forward-Looking Conceptualization of Responsibility: Implications and 
Moral Considerations 
 Everything in the previous discussion concerns the backward-looking conceptualiza-
tion of responsibility. We now turn to the forward-looking view. Such a rendering is 
defended by, among others, J. J. C. Smart.  14  In a nutshell, a forward-looking con-
ceptualization of responsibility justifi es  holding persons responsible by reference 
to some desirable future state of affairs: “Whatever responsibility is, considered as 
a metaphysical state, unless we can tie it to some recognizable social desideratum, 
it will have no rational claim on our esteem.”  15  Holding persons responsible will 
typically mean either that they are subjected to criticism, censure, or other nega-
tive appraisals or that they are held  cost- responsible in some form, for example, in 
terms of demanded compensation, loss of privileges, or similar. A key example here 
is whether the obese should be denied, wholly or partially, free and equal access to 
healthcare,  not because they are somehow personally responsible in the backward-
looking sense but simply because holding the obese responsible will have positive 
consequences (fewer obese people, lower healthcare costs, and so on). The following 
question then arises: should we hold the obese responsible (in the forward-looking 
sense) because it would have some desirable consequences? 
 Before addressing this question, let us make note of the relation between the 
two forms of responsibility. Analytically, these are distinct, but in one sense they 
overlap, because judgments about the justifi ability of holding persons responsible 
for forward-looking reasons often rely on more or less implicit judgments con-
cerning  prior actions, and hence on backward-looking responsibility. What else 
could explain why most people think that deterrence can justify imprisoning 
criminals, but only very few think it justifi able to imprison an innocent, even if the 
effect of deterrence is the same? It is hard not to infer that notions of backward-
looking responsibility psychologically sweeten the pill for judgments concerning 
forward-looking responsibility, and this is probably exacerbated when the ones to 
be held responsible are socially or otherwise marginalized or stigmatized—the 
obese, smokers, alcoholics, and so on. But because, as we have argued, backward-
looking responsibility is a spurious concept, we claim that we are  never justifi ed in 
letting backward-looking responsibility infl uence judgments about the moral status 
or acceptability of forward-looking responsibility. 
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 A very infl uential theory of justice in the contemporary political philosophical 
debate—luck egalitarianism—holds, roughly, that inequalities are unjust except 
when they “track choice”—implying that it is only if we are indeed responsible for 
an outcome that we can be held cost-responsible,  ceteris paribus ,  16  and quite a few 
laypersons seem to agree.  17  Following this theory, if the obese are  not (backward-
looking) responsible, then eventual inequalities stemming from their obesity are 
indeed unjust—at least  ceteris paribus . This latter clause is important, because, 
as we have mentioned, there might be other reasons that could justify holding 
the obese responsible in a forward-looking manner.  18  Holding the obese cost-
responsible may be done, for example, by imposing consumer taxes on fatty food, 
or, taking a perhaps less sympathetic approach, by demanding that the obese pay 
for healthcare services related to obesity. 
 This raises a string of further questions. The fi rst one we want to address is the 
following: is it effi cient to hold individuals cost-responsible for the consequences 
of obesity? We are philosophers, and as such we are ill equipped to answer such 
empirical questions. However, we can qualify the question. The question ought, 
fi rst of all, to be the following: does holding individuals responsible for the conse-
quences of their obesity promote or protect welfare? Obesity is not intrinsically 
bad, nor is being lean necessarily good. Moreover, health is not a moral currency, 
and therefore policies should never be assessed in terms of their impact on health 
alone. Keeping this in mind, the design of policies and interventions relying 
on forward-looking responsibility are likely to be much more sensitive (and 
reasonably so) to all the welfare-affecting issues such policies will inevitably have: 
criticism and blame will likely lower the mental well-being of the obese, lead to 
increased stigmatization and stress, lower the status of the obese, and so forth. 
Imposing ex ante costs in the forms of, for example, fat taxes will lower the welfare 
of those who cannot or will not change their patterns of consumption. And 
of course, imposing costs on the obese for obesity-related diseases will likely 
dramatically lower opportunities and welfare for many obese. These and other 
relevant moral considerations are less likely to be obscured if one focuses on the 
real issue—welfare—rather than health, BMI, or similar. Moreover, it should 
always be the case that a given intervention is the most effi cient way of raising or 
protecting welfare  as compared with other courses of action . In sum, there are reasons 
to be skeptical about whether holding the obese responsible will in fact (best) pro-
mote welfare, all things considered. 
 An alternative way of arguing for the responsibilization of the obese takes its 
cue not from the purported goal of protecting the health and well-being of the 
obese but rather from protecting the interests of the healthy: it can be argued that 
the obese (statistically) impose (unfair) burdens on the healthy.  19  It might then be 
argued that holding the obese responsible (given that it is effective) is justifi ed at 
least partly because it serves the interests of the non-obese. Again, assessing 
whether and when this is the case is an empirical question and depends on how 
the relevant institutions are set up. However, some research points in the direction 
that, at least in more egalitarian societies with free and equal access to healthcare 
as the ideal, the obese are not in fact an all-things-considered economic burden,  20  
even before increased costs to public pensions (on the premise that preventing 
obesity will lead to increased longevity) are taken into consideration. 
 However, suppose that some way of holding the obese responsible is in fact best 
in terms of an all-things-considered aggregation of welfare. Utilitarians need not 
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take other factors into consideration, but for those with other moral inclinations, it 
is necessary to pose the question, “At what price to other values, such as personal 
autonomy, equal respect, and so on, can society pursue policies that hold the obese 
cost-responsible?”  21  Fleck here mentions three overall issues: trust in the doctor 
patient-relationship, privacy rights, and personal autonomy. The fi rst two issues 
concern the fact that if doctors must act as gatekeepers or judges vis-à-vis the 
health behavior of citizens, then the bonds of trust between doctors and patients 
are undermined, and the doctor betrays some fundamental, role-related duties 
(which will more than likely have bad social consequences, apart from breaching 
those duties), including the duty to respect the privacy rights of the patients. 
 The third issue—the more general question of personal autonomy—relates to the 
perhaps most acute and controversial question in public health ethics, namely, 
the controversy over the role and status of personal liberty in the liberal tradition 
weighed against collective, aggregate interests, for example, of a more communi-
tarian bent.  22  “The establishment of public health ethics as a discipline in its own 
right seems innately related to questioning the suitability of a liberal framework.”  23  
In essence, the question concerns whether or not, or to which degree, it is justifi -
able to infringe or violate individual rights of liberty in order to pursue collective 
goals such as promoting aggregate welfare. In terms more familiar to political 
philosophers, the question concerns the issue of due respect for individuals’ 
conception of the good: some might set for their own lives the goal of living the 
longest and healthiest life possible, but such an ideal will remain controversial and 
cannot command the allegiance of all reasonable citizens. This is, of course, a huge 
and hugely complicated issue. What remains uncontroversial, at least relatively 
speaking, is the fact that liberal values speak against heavy-handed responsibili-
zation of the obese and other potential victims of so-called lifestyle diseases. This 
is because pursuing public health by political means runs the risk of violating the 
liberal requirement of neutrality between competing yet reasonable conceptions 
of the good.  24  Imposing personal costs on citizens having an “indulgent” or 
“risky” lifestyle is easily translated into forms of moralizing that are incompatible 
with liberal values. Naturally, there are health-related cases of imposing costs on 
citizens that only few liberals would deem morally problematic. Outlawing the 
use of highly dangerous chemicals in food production is justifi able, because no 
reasonable conception of the good is compromised by that. Conversely, criminal-
ization of the selling of fatty foods  will unduly restrict some reasonable citizens’ 
pursuit of their conception of the good. This of course leaves plenty of room for 
controversy, including family disputes within the liberal camp over cases that 
fall between these extremes. Nevertheless, on any plausibly liberal account, the 
suggestion to penalize some citizens’ conception of the good (or evaluation of the 
value of health and longevity, if you want),  even if this produces some socially 
desirable results, must be scrutinized closely and weighed against the values of 
public reason given the fact of pluralism, and these values should not be taken 
lightly. Moreover, we claim that all people, not just liberals, have good reasons to 
adopt this attitude toward forward-looking responsibilization of the obese. Given 
pluralism, the liberal vision of the legitimate use of the coercive powers of the state 
is the most cogent and persuasive on the market, and it is especially relevant when 
it comes to deeply controversial questions concerning the value of health.  25  It is 
sometimes taken for granted that health claims are somehow less controversial 
than other lifestyle-related ones.  26  In Rawlsian terms, health could be viewed as 
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something akin to a  primary good , that is, something that all would want more 
rather than less of, irrespectively of their more particular comprehensive concep-
tion of the good. But although it is probably true that all reasonable citizens would 
prefer good health over bad, it is not true that all emphasize it equally. In particular, 
which kind of burdens and restrictions and policies and mandates that are accept-
able in the pursuit of health will remain deeply controversial among reasonable 
citizens. In that light, responsibilization of the obese is bound to remain an at least 
 prima facie dubious practice as seen from the light of public reason. In Gaus’s 
terms, holding the obese responsible will likely be an authoritarian (tyrannical) 
rather than an authoritative (justifi ed in the light of public reason) political act. 
 Here, a liberal rejoinder is possible. Most liberals, including liberal egalitarians, 
deny that a liberal political order is meant to produce equally good outcomes for 
all people, irrespective of their conception of the good. The individual with cheap 
tastes—say, jogging and spring water—will  ceteris paribus face an easier challenge 
when it comes to preference satisfaction than the one with expensive tastes—say, 
for burgundy wine and opulent meals. Because this does not jeopardize neutrality 
on the standard Rawlsian interpretation of liberal egalitarianism, why should it 
jeopardize neutrality if we (within reason) make it harder for citizens with a taste 
for fatty foods to get their preferences satisfi ed, for example, by ex ante taxation of 
high-fat or high-calorie foods? Our answer is this: if the background for such a 
policy of ex ante taxation were that (1) the obese  are an all-things-considered burden 
on other taxpayers, (2) the obese and the non-obese (actually or counterfactually) 
have equal starting points (i.e., there is no socioeconomic difference between the 
groups in favor of the non-obese), and (3) the policy is, or is reasonably expected 
to be, effective in terms of reducing bad consequences of obesity and/or promoting 
welfare, then holding the obese responsible on a forward-looking conception 
of responsibility is not necessarily in confl ict with neutrality or liberal egalitarian 
values more generally. However, we fi nd it unlikely that all of the three conditions 
hold true, or approximately true, in any society—or that they will ever hold true 
in any future one. Hence, we probably should not hold the obese responsible, on 
either a backward- or a forward-looking conception of responsibility. 
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